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Abstract: Goal programming is often applied into uncertain group decision
making to achieve the optimal solution. Exiting models focus on either the
minimum cost (guaranteeing negotiation budget) or the maximum utility
(improving satisfaction level). This paper constructs a stochastic optimization
cost consensus group decision making model adopting the minimum budget
and the maximum utility as objective function simultaneously to study the
negotiation consensus with decision makers’ opinions expressed in the forms of
multiple uncertain preferences such as utility function and normal distribution.
Thus, the proposed model is a generalization of the existing cost consensus model
and utility consensus model, respectively. Furthermore in this model, utility
priority coefficients cause acceptable budget range and chance constraint shows
the probability of reaching consensus. Differing from previous optimization
models, the proposed model designs a Monte Carlo simulation combined with
Genetic Algorithm to reach an optimal solution, which makes it more applicable
to real-world decision making.
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1 Introduction
Group Decision Making (GDM) is a process that consists of more than one person participating
in both the decision analysis and the final decision choice [1, 2], which allows for the expression of
collective wisdom and opinion. GDM seeks a solution through a process in which decision makers
(DMs) achieve a unified opinion, to a certain extent, by gradually changing their own views [3]. The
unified opinion is called group consensus. In some decision making systems, moderators (with superior
leadership, communication, negotiation, and interpersonal skills) represent collective interests and help
the group reach a consensus. The negotiations and consultations with individual DMs generate costs,
including economic compensation and resource consumption [4]. Cost consensus is everywhere in life.
Aimed at this topic, Ben-Arieh et al. [5, 6] and Gong et al. [4, 7] proposed a serious of cost consensus
models:
• Ben-Arieh et al. suggested to reach a consensus at a minimum cost. Then, they developed
consensus models with opinion deviation threshold or specified budget constraint.
• Gong et al. introduced cost consensus models with maximum utility of the whole GDM process
under the limited budget. They explored different utility preference functions in particular.
The models mentioned above can measure cost or utility in the process of negotiations and
deal with the consensus decision making well. However, they all work from just one perspective.
Furthermore, the budget is usually not fixed, it will float according to the practical situation. Hence,
in this paper, a stochastic optimization group cost consensus decision making (SOCCGDM) model is
proposed to guarantee the minimum cost range and maximum DMs’ satisfaction utility with uncertain
opinions. The proposed SOCCGDM model has the following features:
(1) Apart from fuzzy numbers [8, 9, 10, 11] and utility functions [12, 13] used to measure DMs’
preferences, such as the linear utility functions including triangle utility functions [14], S-shape utility
functions [15], and trapezoidal utility functions [16], the nonlinear utility functions constructed by
Gong et al. [7] and André and Riesgo [17], this paper proposes normal distribution to simulate
the moderators’ and individual DMs’ preferences in case of inaccessible fuzzy numbers and utility
functions; the distribution law of mathematical statistics can better explain the inherent characteristics
of the preferences when it is difficult to measure DMs’ satisfaction level precisely.
(2) Based on the previous studies mentioned above [4, 5, 6, 7], to study the cost consensus group
decision making (CCGDM) in a more systematic and complete way, the objective function is composed
of the minimum budget and the maximum utility simultaneously. Moreover, the priority of utility is
designed to cause acceptable cost range.
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(3) In the constraints, the random constrained budget optimization is implemented to measure
the probability of reaching consensus. Stochastic optimization refers to the optimization problem
with random factors [18]. Scholars have analyzed decision making problems with uncertain random
programming [19, 25, 26]. In terms of getting solutions, Chen et al. [22] investigated the chance-
constrained model and achieved the deterministic equivalents based on the uncertainty theory; Liu et
al. [23] provided uncertain multiobjective programming model and turned it to crisp one via inverse
uncertainty distributions; while Abdelaziz et al. [24] converted the multi-objective stochastic program
into a deterministic one by combining two models.
(4) However, in the proposed model a Monte Carlo algorithm is used to achieve the optimal
solution to a random consensus model, and random conditions can be dealt with by using this useful
tool instead of being transformed into certain ones as mentioned above. Differing from the common
optimization technique [2, 8, 22], the Monte Carlo simulations ensures that the costs of a negotiation
between a moderator and individual decision makers reflect the real-world decision-making needs to
reach a consensus within a certain budget.
The reminder of this paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 introduces the cost consensus mod-
els proposed by Ben-Arieh & Easton and the improved model considering individual DMs’ preference
utility suggested by Gong. On the basis of the DMs’ different available preferences, four new general
kind of cost consensus models with random distribution and preference utility in are introduced in
Section 3. The proposed consensus models view the minimum negotiation cost and maximum utility
as goals; and the consensus reaching with probability and preference characteristics as constraints.
Taking the SOCCGDM problem into the Grains to Greens Program (GTGP) in China as an example,
Section 4 builds a cost consensus model based on negotiation cost and preferences (Section 4.1), then
economically analyzes the model results (Section 4.2). The conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2 Problem description
Ben-Arieh et al.’s [5, 6] minimum cost consensus model relies on the basic hypotheses that there
is a moderator representing the group’s interests, whose optimal opinion is the group consensus and
individual DMs represent different interest groups, there is a discrepancy between their opinions
with consensus, and the moderator will generate a particular costs to contribute to consensus. It is










where m is the number of individual DMs, ωi is the unit cost that the moderator d
′ pays to the
individual di to obtain the optimal consensus, oi is the opinion supplied by individual di, O is the
feasible set of consensus opinions o′, |oi − o′| measures the distance or deviation of opinions between
o′ and oi, ωi · |oi − o′| is the expense d′ pays to di with
m∑
i=1
ωi · |oi − o′| being the total cost to achieve
group consensus.
Suppose that the DMs’ preferences are intervals. The minimum cost consensus group decision




ωi · |oi − o′|
s.t.
 oi ∈ [ai, bi], i ∈Mo′ ∈ O
(2)
where M represents the collection of all individuals in the GDM system, M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}; ai and bi
are the lower and upper bounds of the interval preference given by individual di, respectively.
Models (1)–(2) focus on the minimum cost to obtain the optimal consensus only from the per-
spective of the moderator’s interests, though this model is likely to sacrifice individuals’ interests,
decreasing their willingness to change their original opinion. An improved model would fully consider
individual DMs’ preference utility as well in order to guarantee both individuals’ value in the GDM
and the moderator’s expectations of the individuals’ final opinion, and so the DMs’ optimal utility
would replace the minimum cost as the goal of consensus . For this purpose, the moderator would
encourage individuals to change their original opinions through a looser budget instead of minimizing






ωi · |oi − o′| = B (3− 1)
λ ≤ U1(oi) (3− 2)
λ ≤ U2(o′) (3− 3)
oi ∈ [ai, bi], i ∈M,o′ ∈ O, λ ∈ [0, 1] (3− 4)
(3)
where λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) is the DMs’ utility value, and the higher value of λ the higher utility level and a
better match between the GDM result and the DMs’ subjective preferences, so it should be as large
as possible; B is the total budget determined in advance; U1(oi) and U2(o
′) are the utility functions
of di and d
′, respectively; ai and bi are the lower and upper bounds of the interval preference given by
individual di, respectively. Constraint (3-1) is the budget description; constraints (3-2) and (3-3) are
utility characterizations of di and d
′, respectively.
Model (3) has been studied using different utility functions to represent the DMs’ preference,
among with we can cite: concave, intermediate, convex, S- and inverted S-types. In this paper, we
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will only use the right and left partial membership function to represent DMs’ utility as represented
in Figure 1. Here, we assume that the moderator’s opinion preference o′ obeys the left membership
function and indicates that the decision opinion is biased toward the lower limit of range. In this
case, a smaller value is better. oi obeys the right membership functions, indicating that the decision
opinion is biased toward upper limit of range where a higher value is better.
Figure 1: Preference Utility Functions
In an uncertain environment, using utility functions to measure DMs’ preference is difficult, so we
introduce the probability distribution in mathematical statistics to grasp the internal data features of
opinions. This paper thus builds SOCCGDM models that consider random distribution and preference
utility based on the DMs’ differing preference relation forms.
3 Consensus modeling with random distribution and preference util-
ity
The models proposed by Ben-Arieh and Easton [5, 6] and Gong et al. [4, 7] consider consensus
from the perspective of cost or utility, so generalized models in this paper are constructed to analyze
these two aspects simultaneously. Also, the budget is presented as intervals instead of fixed number.
We assume that the budget for consensus negotiations is β and the probability of cost consumption
is α. Introducing this concept means mastering the probability of consensus under a specific budget,
and then promoting efficient consensus attainment. The different DMs all adopt utility functions to
describe preferences under uncertainty environments. In this model, we also consider circumstances
where the utility functions and preference relations are not accessible, and build the SOCCGDM model
with random distribution constraints and the probability of achieving consensus.
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3.1 Moderator’s budget
3.1.1 Situation one: Consensus modeling with preference utility of individuals’ opinions
and random distribution of moderator’s opinions
Assume that o′ obeys the normal distribution [20], oi are all linear right membership functions.
The SOCCGDM model is constructed as follows:






ωi · |oi − o′| ≤ β} ≥ α (4− 1)
λ ≤ oi−min{oi}max{oi}−min{oi} (4− 2)
oi ∈ [ai, bi], i ∈M (4− 3)
o′ ∼ N(µ, σ2) (4− 4)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (4− 5)
(4)
where constraint (4-1) states that the consensus cost shall not exceed β below the probability α. In
other words, the probability that the total cost
m∑
i=1
ωi · |oi − o′|, which the moderator pays to the
individuals to change their opinions, being no more than β is at least α. Constraint (4-2) is the
utility constraint: the individual DMs’ opinions oi are between ai and bi (see constraint (4-3)), and
individual DMs always aim to have the consensus as close to bi as possible, with the individuals’
preference computed via their right utility function. In constraint (4-2), the greater the λ value is, the
closer the oi is biased toward the right end of the interval value. Constraint (4-4) is the distribution
of the moderator’s opinion o′. Here, we suppose that o′ obeys the normal distribution with average µ
and variance σ2. Constraint (4-5) provides the range of the utility value.
In Model (4), the optimal solution maximizes utility value λ and minimizes negotiation cost β.
Consequently, the objective function Min (β − P · λ) (namely, Min β + Max P · λ) states that to
reach consensus, the budget is as small as possible for the moderator and satisfies all individual DMs’
utilities as large as possible, simultaneously. P , utility adjustment coefficient (P ≥ 1; P = 1, 10,
100, 1000 and 10000 in this article), ensures the maximum utility reaching, is introduced to show
that considering the DMs’ utility satisfaction can contribute to harmonious consensus reaching even
though the minimum budget stands a good chance of sacrificing. Under this circumstance, the scope
of cost budget [Min βp=1,Min βp>1] is formed with the probability α. The following subsections omit
the explanations.
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3.1.2 Situation two: Consensus modeling with preference utility of moderator’s opinions
and random distribution of individuals’opinions
Assume that o′ is a linear left membership function, and oi obeys the normal distribution. The
corresponding SOCCGDM model is constructed as follows:












o′ ∈ [o′l, o′u] (5− 3)
oi ∼ N(µi, σ2i ), i ∈M (5− 4)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (5− 5)
(5)
where constraint (5-2) is a utility constraint. The consensus opinion o is between o′l and o
′
u (see
constraint (5-3)). The moderator always aims for a consensus closer to o′l. We express the moderator’s
preference by constructing the left utility function, indicating that higher values of λ will show a closer
bias of o′ towards the left end of the interval value. Constraint (5-4) is the distribution of the individual
DMs’ opinions oi; here, we suppose that oi obeys the normal distribution with average µi and variance
σ2i .
3.2 Opinion deviations between the individual decision makers and the moderator
We can use decision-making deviation, |oi − o′| ≤ ε(i ∈ M), to measure the distance range
between DMs’ opinions oi and the moderator’s consensus opinion o
′. A smaller value for this deviation
represents a higher degree of consensus. In this section, we construct relative models with deviation
ranges based on the models above to ensure a final result of group consensus.
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3.2.1 Situation one: Consensus modeling with preference utility of individual’s opinions
and random distribution of moderator’s opinions
Based on Section 3.1.1, we construct the SOCCGDM model with opinion deviation as follows:






ωi|oi − o′| ≤ β} ≥ α (6− 1)
λ ≤ oi−min{oi}max{oi}−min{oi} (6− 2)
oi ∈ [ai, bi], i ∈M (6− 3)
o′ ∼ N(µ, σ2) (6− 4)
|oi − o′| ≤ εi, i ∈M (6− 5)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (6− 6)
(6)
Constraints in Model (6) are the same as those in Model (4) with the addition of constraint (6-5),
with states that the moderator controls the deviation within a certain range.
3.2.2 Situation two: Consensus modeling with preference utility of moderator’s opinions
and random distribution of individuals’ opinions
Based on Section 3.1.2, we construct the SOCCGDM model with deviating opinions as follows:












o′ ∈ [o′l, o′u] (7− 3)
oi ∼ N(µi, σ2i ), i ∈M (7− 4)
|oi − o′| ≤ εi, i ∈M (7− 5)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (7− 6)
(7)
As above, constraints in Model (7) are the same as those in Model (5) with the addition of the
moderator control of the deviation within a certain range constraint (7-5).
4 Numerical examples
The Grains to Greens Program (GTGP) is an ecological construction project in China with a large
investment and high degree of mass participation. A reasonable compensation standard is the key to
stimulate farmers’ voluntarily participation in the GTGP. This compensation includes grain subsidies,
seed planting subsidies, living allowances, and so on (unit: acre). However, in practice, the “one price”
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policy, the phenomenon of reverting to the original cultivated land, all expose the irrationality of the
subsidy policy. The subsidy has become an incentive for farmers to return farmland, and is the decisive
factor that ensures a successful negotiation. Narrowing farmers’ disagreements and reaching consensus
on GTGP requires that the local government should consume a certain negotiation “cost” (manpower,
material resources, working expenses, and so on). The local authority wants to control the “cost”
within the local finance capability, and expects the greatest possibility to reach consensus. In addition,
farmers’ own financial situations, land cultivation (land and crops), characteristics, and behavioral
preferences lead them to have different preferences. During the negotiation process, the government’s
preferences are affected by macroscopic arrangements and appropriation budget. Therefore, the local
government and farmers form an uncertain group consensus system based on the GTGP subsidy.
Here, we define the local government as the moderator and farmers as individual DMs. Both groups
combined are the DMs in the decision making system. Thus, we construct the group consensus model
under different circumstances with the preferences of the local government and farmers expressed with
utility functions and distribution characteristics. The aim is to optimize the budget and ensure the
satisfaction of most DMs. Furthermore, the local government can roughly grasp the negotiation results
before consultation by introducing the probability of cost, and then make a reasonable plan for fiscal
expenditures ahead of time, which helps to reach a consensus efficiently.
Assume that a GTGP negotiation includes local government d′ and 4 farmers d1, d2, d3, d4. The
unit cost of each farmer is ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.2, ω3 = 0.8 and ω4 = 0.4, respectively. The anticipated
cost consumption of local government is β and the opinion deviation ranges between the farmers and
the local authority is ε1 = 1.1, ε2 = 1.3, ε3 = 0.9 and ε4 = 1.5, respectively.
4.1 Numerical models of Grains to Greens Program
Based on Section 3.1.1, assume that the opinion of local government oi obeys the normal distribu-
tion with average value 18 and variance value 3. The farmers’ opinions are described using the linear
right partial membership functions of Figure 2 in the intervals: o1 = [17, 20], o2 = [16, 21], o3 = [22, 24],
and o4 = [18, 23], respectively. The cost consensus model based on local government’s opinion distri-
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bution is:
Min( β − P λ)
s.t.

Pr{0.5|o1 − o′|+ 0.2|o2 − o′|+ 0.8|o3 − o′|+ 0.4|o4 − o′| ≤ β} ≥ α
λ ≤ o1−1720−17 , λ ≤
o2−16
21−16 , λ ≤
o3−22
24−22 , λ ≤
o4−18
23−18
o1 ∈ [17, 20], o2 ∈ [16, 21], o3 ∈ [22, 24], o4 ∈ [18, 23]
o′ ∼ N(18, 3)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
(8)
Figure 2: Farmers’ Preference Utility Functions
Based on Section 3.1.2, assume that the local government’s opinion o′ is a linear right partial
membership function on the interval o′ = [16, 20], as shown in Figure 3, and that the farmers’ opinions
obey the normal distributions: o1 ∼ N(18, 2), o2 ∼ N(17, 3), o3 ∼ N(23, 1), and o4 ∼ N(20, 2),
respectively. The cost consensus model is based on farmers’ opinions distribution:
Min( β − P λ)
s.t.

Pr{[0.5|o1 − o′|+ 0.2|o2 − o′|+ 0.8|o3 − o′|+ 0.4|o4 − o′|] ≤ β} ≥ α
λ ≤ 20−o′20−16
o′ ∈ [16, 20]
o1 ∼ N(18, 2), o2 ∼ N(17, 3), o3 ∼ N(23, 1), o4 ∼ N(20, 2)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
(9)
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Figure 3: The Local Government’s Preference Utility Function
Based on Section 3.2.1, the cost consensus model with the assumed opinion deviation range using
the same data as above is:
Min( β − P λ)
s.t.

Pr{0.5|o1 − o′|+ 0.2|o2 − o′|+ 0.8|o3 − o′|+ 0.4|o4 − o′| ≤ β} ≥ α
λ ≤ o′−1720−17 , λ ≤
o′−16
21−16 , λ ≤
o′−22
24−22 , λ ≤
o′−18
23−18
o1 ∈ [17, 20], o2 ∈ [16, 21], o3 ∈ [22, 24], o4 ∈ [18, 23]
o′ ∼ N(18, 3)
|o1 − o′| ≤ 1.1 or
|o2 − o′| ≤ 1.3 or
|o3 − o′| ≤ 0.9 or
|o4 − o′| ≤ 1.5
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
(10)
Based on Section 3.2.2, the cost consensus model with the assumed opinion deviation range using
the same data as above is:
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Min (β − P λ)
s.t.

Pr{0.5|o1 − o′|+ 0.2|o2 − o′|+ 0.8|o3 − o′|+ 0.4|o4 − o′| ≤ β} ≥ α
λ ≤ 20−o′20−16
o′ ∈ [16, 20]
o1 ∼ N(18, 2), o2 ∼ N(17, 3), o3 ∼ N(23, 1), o4 ∼ N(20, 2)
|o1 − o′| ≤ 1.1 or
|o2 − o′| ≤ 1.3 or
|o3 − o′| ≤ 0.9 or
|o4 − o′| ≤ 1.5
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
(11)
In the deviation constraint of Model (11), we use the extraction relationship (“or”) to illustrate
the difficulty of completely satisfying each individual DM’s interests in the GDM. In fact, partially
satisfying individual DMs’ can also lead to a consensus.
4.2 Analysis of the consensus model
We can obtain the Pareto optimal solution of Models (8)-(11) using Monte Carlo (stochastic
simulation) and the Genetic Algorithm [21], as well as the budget scope [Min βp=1,Min βp>1] under
different probabilities. In the process of test, we reckon that when P is 1000 or 10000, the model
results are nearly similar to the ones when P is 100, so we define the scope is [Min βp=1,Min βp=100].
Tables (1)-(4) below show the results for Models (8)-(11) (P = 1000, 10000 are not listed), respectively.
From the results, we can conclude that in Model (8) and Model (10), when the priority of λ is
not adjusted (P = 1), the models meet Minβ and Maxλ simultaneously in the objective function.
The individual DMs’ (farmers) opinions are close to the lower limits of intervals. According to the
individual DMs’ right partial membership functions, the value of λ is low, and in this case the costs
are relatively low. When P > 1, that is, sacrificing the minimum cost to improve farmers’ satisfaction
degrees. The individual DMs’ opinions can be close to the upper limits of their corresponding intervals,
so the value of λ is relative high, and in this case the costs are relatively high. In Model (9) and Model
(11), when P = 1, the moderator’s (local government) opinion is close to the right end of its interval.
According to the moderator’s left partial membership functions, the value of λ is low. When P > 1,
the moderator’s (local government) opinion is close to the left end of its interval, so the value of λ is
relatively high. For the moderator, although the budget (when P > 1) is higher than the minimum
budget (when P = 1), it still reflects the small value of the cost, the moderator is agreed by higher
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Table 1: Results for Model (8)
α P o1 o2 o3 o4 o
′ Maxλ Minβ
0.8 1 17.2677 16.6258 22.0406 18.1521 0.0082 5.2547
10 19.6828 20.4524 23.8463 22.4769 0.8677 10.2467
100 19.9805 20.8292 23.9627 22.8942 0.963 10.9852
0.9 1 17.1222 16.4142 22.1603 18.237 0.0308 6.517
10 19.8365 20.6778 23.8679 22.7833 0.9198 12.0444
100 19.9362 20.7862 23.8955 22.9516 0.9353 12.2597
0.95 1 17.2437 16.628 22.2306 18.2269 0.0413 7.7727
10 19.8947 20.6421 23.8979 22.6788 0.8989 13.0355
100 19.8782 20.8751 23.9821 22.9614 0.9533 16.1305
0.98 1 17.0721 16.8711 22.1971 18.0521 0.0049 8.9262
10 19.9436 20.7945 23.8696 22.7449 0.9271 14.535
100 19.9267 20.8608 23.9651 22.8418 0.9657 14.9215
0.99 1 17.2403 16.5278 22.164 18.1657 0.0079 9.6577
10 19.8845 20.7419 23.9288 22.481 0.8942 15.2581
100 19.8611 20.9855 23.9444 22.7729 0.9443 16.3608
satisfaction degree.
Generally, through the computation of the four models, we can find that: the utility value increases
obviously along with the chances of utility priority P ; minimum cost also increases accordingly (when P
reaches higher level, the variation of Minβ and Maxλ are tiny). Along with the obvious better chance
of reaching a consensus (i.e. 0.8-0.9), the minimum budget increases accordingly. Low probability is
corresponding to the low cost, however in the high probability range, because the consensus budget
has reached a relative high level, the increased probability do not always lead to higher costs, even
though there is an increase, it will not be obvious. From the results, the government can grasp the
probability of reaching consensus under different budgets. In addition, the proposed approach provides
the acceptable cost range, allowing the expected concession to be at the disposition of the government.
5 Conclusion
In researching CCGDM, the uncertainty of the decision-making environment, DMs’ changeable
behavior preference and other complex factors can contribute to cost exceeding the budget range
(interval) with a certain probability. Therefore, introducing the probability measure of consensus into
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Table 2: Results for Model (9)
α P o1 o2 o3 o4 o
′ Maxλ Minβ
0.8 1 19.6608 0.081 5.413
10 16.0127 0.9964 9.45
100 16.0009 0.9996 9.4816
0.9 1 19.5963 0.0984 5.8788
10 16.0241 0.9911 9.9193
100 16.002 0.9994 10.0077
0.95 1 19.5941 0.0963 6.2825
10 16.0087 0.9971 10.3904
100 16.0013 0.9987 10.3924
0.98 1 19.5804 0.0916 6.6871
10 16.0203 0.9945 10.8248
100 16.0014 0.9992 10.3735
0.99 1 19.624 0.0817 6.913
10 16.0161 0.9901 11.0479
100 16.0003 0.9992 11.2277
Table 3: Results for Model (10)
α P o1 o2 o3 o4 o
′ Maxλ Minβ
0.8 1 19.9274 20.1499 22.0214 20.395 0.0082 3.3328
10 19.8576 20.7504 23.8603 22.6463 0.9281 5.8324
100 19.9599 20.7623 23.8732 22.7982 0.9244 5.9333
0.9 1 19.9872 20.2184 22.2029 20.4016 0.0683 3.7951
10 19.9168 20.6812 23.9649 22.793 0.935 6.2244
100 19.9997 20.9651 23.9408 22.9454 0.9604 6.5953
0.95 1 19.9597 20.3252 22.0262 20.4551 0.0003 3.7932
10 19.9877 20.7395 23.9308 22.9021 0.9353 6.3976
100 19.968 20.8308 23.968 22.8645 0.9533 6.4977
0.98 1 19.9975 20.1798 22.1253 20.3727 0.0517 3.9715
10 19.9803 20.7496 23.954 22.8388 0.9418 6.5208
100 19.8832 20.7692 23.9249 22.9328 0.9525 6.6299
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0.99 1 19.9779 20.2007 22.1173 20.4063 0.0569 3.9837
10 19.9097 20.7916 23.9138 22.7172 0.9367 6.5557
100 19.9886 20.9726 23.9695 22.8889 0.9771 6.6046
Table 4: Results for Model (11)
α P o1 o2 o3 o4 o
′ Maxλ Minβ
0.8 1 19.9265 0.0127 5.1132
10 16.0019 0.9954 9.0859
100 16.0001 0.9999 9.1463
0.9 1 19.5505 0.0902 5.6445
10 16.0596 0.9797 9.454
100 16.0013 0.9992 10.7531
0.95 1 19.6424 0.0852 6.0313
10 16.012 0.9953 9.9224
100 16.0031 0.9991 10.0707
0.98 1 19.618 0.08 6.3215
10 16.0234 0.9924 10.3518
100 16.0015 0.9993 10.4701
0.99 1 19.6584 0.053 6.6013
10 16.0759 0.9796 10.448
100 16.0014 0.9994 10.4577
the decision making system can explain the process and results better. Furthermore, it is difficult to
measure DMs’ preference precisely in some uncertain CCGDM. The distribution law of mathematical
statistics can better explain the inherent characteristics of the preference relations. So this paper
considered the utility function and normal distribution to simulate the moderators’ and individual
DMs’ preference relations. It is worth noting that complete consensus is difficult to achieve, and
opinion deviation ranges are thus proposed to measure consensus level. This model not only considers
the optimal cost budget, but also the utility maximization. The numerical simulation indicates that
the budget increases along with the chances of reaching a consensus on the whole. In addition,
utility value increases obviously along with the chances of utility priority, minimum cost also increases
accordingly. The SOCCGDM model has following contributions:
(1) Introducing the probability into the budget constraint, the model considers simultaneously the op-
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timal cost budget and the utility maximization. It extends both Ben-Arieh et al.’s [5, 6] minimum
cost consensus model and Gong et al.’s [4] maximum utility model.
(2) The model adopts interval cost-optimized value [Min βp=1,Min βp>1] to determine the upper
and lower bounds of the negotiation cost. Compared with the rigid budget model, it is a better
means to improve the resilience of budget in the context of satisfying numerous DM’s utility.
(3) The model uses Monte Carlo simulation to achieve the optimal solution to a random consensus
model, which is more in line with the real-world decision-making.
This paper takes GTGP negotiation as the background application and constructs a cost consen-
sus model demonstrated with a numerical example that minimizes a local government’s budget and
maximizes farmers’/ local government’s utility with the probability of budget realization and farm-
ers’/ local government’s preferences as constraints. The case study shows that the proposed model
has good applicability. It can be applied in consensus negotiations with probability of achievement
and uncertain opinions between moderator and individual DMs.
Uncertain expression forms of opinions’ preferences is difficult to simulate accurately in real-word
decision making, and as such it is a limitation of this work that deserves future work on determining
best realistic preference representation formats. Also, in future, we plan to consider the communication
and trust between individual DMs in the process of negotiation. The social network should be applied
into consensus decision making [27, 28, 29] because individuals will rely on or accept the opinions from
people close to them or with similar interests. So, the complicated social trust relationship will be
considered and implemented to handle the preferences forming in SOCCGDM.
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